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Abstract
Central Bank Collateral Frameworks
This paper seeks to inform about a feature of monetary policy that is largely
overlooked, yet occupies a central role in modern monetary and financial systems,
namely central bank collateral frameworks. Their importance can be understood
by the observation that the money at the core of these systems, central bank
money, is injected into the economy on terms, not defined in a market, but by
the collateral frameworks and interest rate policies of central banks. Using the
collateral framework of the Eurosystem as a basis of illustration and case study,
the paper brings to light the functioning, reach, and impact of collateral frame-
works. A theme that emerges is that collateral frameworks may have distortive
effects on financial markets and the wider economy. They can, for example, bias
the private provision of real liquidity and thereby also the allocation of resources
in the economy as well as contribute to financial instability. Evidence is pre-
sented that the collateral framework in the euro area promotes risky and illiquid
collateral and, more generally, impairs market forces and discipline. The paper
also emphasizes the important role of ratings and government guarantees in the
Eurosystem’s collateral framework.
Keywords: central bank, banks, collateral, money, liquidity, monetary system, fi-
nancial system, monetary policy, ratings, guarantees, haircuts, Eurosystem, ECB
JEL: E58, E42, E52, E44, G10, G01, G21
Money is economical power.
– Walter Bagehot (1873)
1 Introduction
If money is economic power and money is issued against collateral, it follows that
it is important to understand the nature of the collateral and the terms of the
exchange. The money at the core of modern economies is central bank money,
what bankers call liquidity. This is injected into the economy, through banks as
intermediaries, on terms not defined in a market, but by the collateral frameworks
and interest rate policies of central banks. In some jurisdictions, or currency ar-
eas, central bank independence means that collateral frameworks are not subject
to formal supervision, review, or even much by way of discussion. Public focus
has instead been directed towards interest rates or monetary aggregates. There
is also a dearth of academic focus on central bank collateral policies. Collateral
frameworks are largely shrouded in opacity. This paper therefore aims to bring
to light the functioning, reach, and impact of collateral frameworks.
A central bank’s collateral framework is a part of its monetary policy. It is
commonly accepted that monetary policy affects the wider economy. There is also
emerging evidence that there are monetary effects in financial markets. However,
most work on these topics look at broad brush policy variables such as short
term interest rates or the quantity of money. There is little work that studies
the micro-foundation of the monetary system and its impact on markets and
the economy. Learning more about collateral frameworks contributes towards
filling that gap. This is important in light of the ongoing challenges in the
global economy, where central banks are engaged in quantitative easing and other
forms of unconventional monetary policy in an effort to stabilize and support the
economy, banks, and the financial markets. In the euro area, monetary policy is
even in the vanguard in the fight to save the euro and European project itself.
The collateral framework of the Eurosystem is an integral part of that effort.1
1See Nyborg (2015) for further discussion on this point. The Eurosystem is the collective
structure of national central banks in the euro area spearheaded by the European Central Bank
(ECB).
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Banking and finance are central to the broader economy because money flows
through the banking sector and the financial system. A better understanding of
how this works requires in the first instance a deeper and more detailed knowledge
of monetary system architecture. While central bank working groups have issued
reports on collateral frameworks (e.g., Cheun, von Ko¨ppen-Mertes, and Weller,
2009; BCBS, 2013b), these are overviews that do not go into depth with respect
to how these frameworks actually function or what their broader consequences
may be. A theme that will emerge in this paper is that collateral frameworks
may have distortive effects on financial markets and the wider economy.
Different central banks have different collateral frameworks. There are com-
mon features, but details can vary a great deal. The focus in this paper is on
the framework of the Eurosystem, which the ECB is authorized to design and
update (ECB, 2000/7). This is an especially interesting case to study because
of the richness and complexity that arise from a single currency across multiple
countries and the very wide range of collateral banks can use to obtain central
bank money directly from the Eurosystem. The euro area also represents one
of the largest economies in the world. Its well publicized financial, economic,
and political problems have significant impact on global markets and the world
economy. Concerns about the euro itself are intermingled with, and, arguably,
at the core of these problems. Gaining a more sound understanding of the euro
area’s monetary system at the most fundamental level is therefore of great value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
on the market for liquidity and its influence on, and relation to, the broader
financial markets. This includes a brief discussion of the severe problems in these
markets during the financial crisis and the expansion in central bank balance
sheets that resulted from the unconventional monetary policies pursued to deal
with the crisis. Since larger balance sheets means more money being created
against more collateral of potentially questionable quality, this illustrates the
growing importance of collateral and central bank collateral frameworks. But
the significance of collateral frameworks is not limited to the crisis.
The general importance of collateral frameworks is discussed in Section 3,
with an emphasis on the potential costs that can arise from collateral framework
design. I argue that collateral frameworks can influence and distort financial mar-
kets and the real economy. Section 3 also sheds light on how collateral frameworks
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work in practice by describing central features of the framework used in the euro
area. I provide evidence that the Eurosystem’s collateral framework promotes
lower quality (more risky and illiquid) collateral and also touch on the important
role of ratings and guarantees. Further details, both in terms of the legal rules of
the Eurosystem’s collateral framework and empirical facts shedding light on how
it works in practice, is provided by Nyborg (2015).
One of the implications of the findings presented in Section 3 is that the
Eurosystem’s collateral framework undermines market discipline. This is the
topic of Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
There is an enormous amount of work on monetary policy transmission channels.
This paper complements and contributes to that literature, but does not emanate
from it. Instead, it can be characterized as the product of the literatures on the
market for liquidity, monetary effects in financial markets, collateral, and finan-
cial intermediation. With respect to the first of these, what is especially relevant
for this paper is the literature that studies open market operations and the in-
teraction of banks and the central bank. I will touch on this in subsection 2.2.
Collateral is discussed towards the end of this section and the most relevant lit-
erature on financial intermediation is touched on in the next section. I start here
by briefly discussing the evidence on monetary effects in financial markets from
a rather “selfish” perspective.
2.1 Money matters in financial markets
Work I have done with Per O¨stberg on the details of the interaction between
the market for liquidity and the broader financial markets shows that money
matters in financial markets in part because frictions in interbank markets spill
over into the broader markets through what we call liquidity pull-back (Nyborg
and O¨stberg, 2014). There is also evidence that asset prices and measures of
liquidity in financial markets are affected by monetary shocks (see, e.g., Fleming
and Remolona, 1997; Fair, 2002; Flannery and Protopapadekis, 2002; Bernanke
and Kuttner, 2005; Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005). Liquidity pull-
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back is a monetary phenomenon acted out in financial markets. It is based
on the important role played by central bank money in modern banking and
financial systems. Central bank money is the currency, or liquidity, banks need
to satisfy reserve requirements, allow for depositor withdrawals, settle interbank
transactions, etc. It is injected into the banking system through central bank
operations and then reallocated among banks. For many transactions, there is
no substitute for central bank money. Thus, for any bank, having sufficient
central bank money at any point in time is a binding constraint.
However, conditions in the interbank market may fluctuate. At times it may
be “tight,” in the sense that the price of liquidity is high and some banks may have
exhausted interbank credit limits. If so, banks may seek alternative sources of
central bank money. But as observed by Friedman (1970): “One man can reduce
his nominal money balances only by persuading someone else to increase his.”
The same holds true for banks. Friedman’s observation is echoed by Tobin (1980):
“The nominal supply of money is something to which the economy must adapt,
not a variable that adapts itself to the economy – unless the policy authorities
want it to.” These restriction can be overcome by borrowing from the central
bank’s lending facility (discount window), but this is expensive. A bank can
also attempt to attract new, or retain old, deposits, but this is a slow process.
Liquidity pull-back offers an alternative approach, namely to obtain liquidity
through interacting with financial markets; by pulling liquidity back from them.
This can be done several ways, most obviously by selling financial assets di-
rectly.2 The mechanism within a bank through which this may happen is that
the bank’s internal liquidity management system feeds into trading desks’ limits,
reducing them. Alternatively, liquidity pull-back can be achieved by increasing
margins to levered investors or haircuts in repos (repurchase agreements). Liquid-
ity pull-back does not increase the quantity of central bank money in the system.
However, the actions I have described can increase the selling (or acting) bank’s
liquidity balances, as long as the (ultimate) buyer banks with another bank.
O¨stberg and I emphasize that a feature of the theoretical idea we sketch in
our paper is that financial assets serve as a storage facility for liquidity that a
bank can tap into if it should face a shortfall. We draw out the implications
of this idea with respect to effect of interbank tightness on volume, order flow,
2See, e.g., Kashyap and Stein (2000) for evidence on banks’ holdings of securities.
4
and returns in the broader financial markets. The empirical evidence is strongly
supportive.
Nyborg and O¨stberg (2014) thus show that the way banks obtain central bank
money affects financial markets. This supports the perspective in the current pa-
per that collateral frameworks matter, since they determine the terms at which
banks can obtain liquidity directly from the central bank. The process of allo-
cating central bank money in the economy starts with the interaction of central
banks vis-a`-vis banks and this interaction needs to obey the rules and constraints
imposed by the central bank’s collateral framework.
2.2 The market for liquidity
Before the crisis, money markets were viewed by many academics and policy
makers alike as unimportant for the broader financial markets and the economy.
This is not because they were thought of as not serving an important function, but
because they were regarded as functioning extremely well. They were considered
to be highly competitive and liquid – in a word, “boring” – with no significant
impact on the broader financial markets. Yet, the money markets literature shows
that this view was never quite correct.
Hamilton’s (1996) seminal study finds that the Fed funds rate (US overnight
rate) reacts to calendar effects relating to the reserve maintenance period. There
is also evidence that the overnight rate reacts to the supply of reserves (Hamilton,
1997; Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006). Similar effects can be found in the euro
area (e.g., Nautz and Offermanns, 2007; Angelini, 2008; and Beirne, 2012). Fecht,
Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008) and Ro¨sler (2015) also document calendar effects
with respect to volume. These findings are indications of a less than perfect
market for liquidity. Furthermore, using primary market data from ECB main
refinancing operations (repo auctions) well before the crisis, Bindseil, Nyborg,
and Strebulaev (2009) find evidence that the market for liquidity in the euro
area is informationally efficient, but at the same time allocationally inefficient.
The existence of inefficiencies in the market for liquidity explains the positive
support in the data for the liquidity pull-back idea. Indeed, that work was mo-
tivated by the empirical evidence that interbank markets are not efficient, even
during times of normalcy. An earlier ECB working paper by Nyborg, Bindseil,
and Strebulaev (2002) also finds evidence consistent with the idea that the collat-
5
eral framework affects banks’ willingness to pay for liquidity. In particular, these
authors conclude that eurozone banks are not indifferent as to what collateral
they use in transactions with the Eurosystem. After the onset of the financial
crisis in August 2007, the significance of the market for liquidity and collateral
has become greatly magnified, as will be explained below.
2.3 The financial crisis and unconventional monetary pol-
icy
A central (and much studied) aspect of the financial crisis is the emergence of
severe frictions in the interbank market for liquidity. Interestingly, therefore,
Nyborg and O¨stberg (2014) find that the liquidity pull-back effect as a day-to-
day phenomenon became weaker, or harder to identify. A potential explanation
for this is that the financial crisis represented a massive liquidity pull-back event,
where money and securities as close as possible to money (e.g., treasury bills) were
sought by investors and banks and the day-today liquidity pull-back effect was
dwarfed by the much larger pattern of the crisis (think fractals). In addition, the
large injections by central banks of liquidity in response to the crisis eventually
made it less necessary for banks to engage in liquidity pull-back. Instead, they
could post collateral to the central bank and receive liquidity directly that way.
While the market for liquidity did not stop functioning during the crisis, it
functioned less well than before (see, e.g., Cassola, Holthausen, and Lo Duca,
2010, for the euro area and Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar, 2011, for the US.)
Dysfunction in the market for liquidity was a central feature of the crisis. The
price of liquidity shot up (Figure 1) while volume shifted in from longer to shorter
maturities and fell overall (Abbassi, Bra¨uning, Fecht, and Peydro´, 2014; Gabrieli
and Georg, 2015; and Ro¨sler, 2015). The turmoil in the interbank market for
liquidity was accompanied by a massive loss of value in asset prices. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, using equities as an example. While Figure 1 uses euro
area data, graphs using corresponding data from other markets (e.g., the US)
would look the same.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Figure 1 plots the spread between the 3-month Euribor and 3-month Eonia
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swap rates (Euribor-Eonia spread), with values on the right-axis, and a broad euro
area stock market index (Euro Stoxx), with values on the left axis. As explained
by Nyborg and O¨stberg (2014), while the Euribor-Eonia spread may reflect credit
risk, it represents more directly the price of liquidity (here, over three months).
A high spread is tantamount to the interbank market for liquidity not working
well. The sharp increase in the spread in August 2007 represents the beginning of
the financial crisis. The spread is seen to peak just after the time of the Lehman
bankruptcy, which occurred on September 15, 2008. That the bankruptcy of a
US institution should trigger a severe tightening in the market for liquidity in
the euro area illustrates the interconnectedness of global markets. Since then,
the spread has come substantially down, though not quite to pre-crisis levels.
The pattern for the stock market is analogous. As the interbank market for
liquidity saw severe tightening, the stock market almost collapsed, losing around
50% of its value from August 2007 to the bottom in March 2009. Since then the
euro area stock market has reversed, gaining back much of the lost ground. Stock
markets around the world reacted similarly.
In response to the stressed conditions that ensued after Lehman Brothers’
bankruptcy, the ECB made significant changes to its monetary operations. On
October 8, 2008, the ECB announced that it would switch from auctioning a
limited quantity of liquidity in its operations to running fixed rate tenders at the
policy rate with full allotment. It would do this for both the main and longer term
refinancing operations (MROs and LTROs, respectively). This represents one of
the most significant actions taken by the ECB in response to the crisis. Under
full allotment, central bank money is not rationed in the refinancing operations,
as it used to be under the old liquidity neutral policy.3 Instead, banks receive
everything they ask for. The only restriction is that they have to pledge sufficient
collateral to cover these amounts. What sufficient means is governed by the
Eurosystem’s collateral framework.
Until October 2008, LTRO money was available with three-month maturities.
After the introduction of the full allotment policy, further problems in the euro
area led to a lengthening of LTRO maturities to one and three years. In total,
in the two three-year LTROs, held in December 2011 and February 2012, banks
asked for, and received, more than EUR 1 trillion.
3See, e.g., Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009).
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Unlimited amounts of three year money was not enough to calm the markets.
The threat to the euro was real enough to move Mario Draghi, President of
the European Central Bank, to make his famous declaration in July 2012 that
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro.”4
On September 6, 2012, this was followed up by the launch of the Outright
Monetary Transactions programme (OMT).5 The OMT allows for unlimited, ster-
ilized purchases of sovereign bonds of countries under a European Financial Sta-
bility Facility/European Stability Mechanism program, but has as of January
2015 yet to be employed. Even so, it is often viewed as representing the “what-
ever it takes” in Draghi’s famous statement quoted above.
But the problems in the eurozone did not go away after the OMT, as evi-
denced, for example, by the continued use of the full allotment policy in open
market operations and ongoing considerations of further unconventional mea-
sures.6 The mere promise of unlimited purchases of troubled sovereigns’ paper
(the OMT) was not enough. Real action was required. Thus, on September 4,
2014, the ECB announced asset backed security (ABS) and covered bond pur-
chase programs that, at the time, were said to possibly add as much as one trillion
to the balance sheet of the Eurosystem. The exact quantity was subject to much
speculation, but reconfirmed in December 2014 and then again in January 2015,
when Draghi finally announced that the Eurosystem would go the extra mile and
start buying sovereign bonds, though not under the OMT but as a part of the
broader ca. one trillion asset purchase program announced in September 2014.
Asset purchases also relate to the collateral framework because it governs, among
other things, what the set of eligible assets are.
4See “Speech by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference in London 26 July
2012,” http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
5See ECB Press Release on 6 September 2012 – Technical features of Outright Monetary
Transactions, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906 1.en.html.
6See, e.g., “Monetary policy communication in turbulent times,” Speech by Mario
Draghi, President of the ECB, at the Conference De Nederlandsche Bank 200
years: Central banking in the next two decades, Amsterdam, 24 April 2014,
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140424.en.html.
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2.4 Central bank balance sheets and the increasing im-
portance of collateral
The accommodative monetary policies of central banks in response to the finan-
cial crisis have substantially increased their balance sheets. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Figure 2a shows the growth in the consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosys-
tem and, by way of comparison, six other central banks, the Federal Reserve
System, Bank of Japan, Bank of China, Bank of Canada, Bank of England, and
Norges Bank (Norway),7 over the period 2000 to 2014. The data are for the end
of each calendar year, except 2014 when the sizes of the balance sheets are taken
at the end of June. For each central bank, each year is benchmarked against
its 2004 balance sheet, which represents 100%. The variation in balance sheet
growth across these countries is quite large. For example, over the 2004 to 6/2014
period, it ranges from less than 100% for the Banks of Japan, Canada, and Nor-
way to approximately 800% for the Bank of England (which, because of this very
large increase, gets its own axis in the plot). The Eurosystem is in the middle,
with an increase of 115%.
Figure 2b plots the size of the balance sheets as a percentage of the respective
countries’ (or currency area’s) GDP, from 2000 to 2013. The Eurosystem’s bal-
ance sheet has increased from around 12% of euro area GDP in 2002 to around
24% in 2013. This is approximately the same percentage in 2013 as for the Bank
of China and the Fed, but less than Banks of England (30%) and Japan (47%). A
balance sheet to GDP ratio of more than 20% is unprecedented before the crisis
over the period sampled here for these countries, with the exception of the Banks
of Japan and China. This illustrates the rising importance of central banks and,
by implication, the assets they hold.
Central bankers are concerned that the growth in central bank balance sheets
over the crisis is associated with these getting weaker as a result of ever worse
collateral being taken on. For example, Thomas Jordan, President of the Swiss
7For the Norges Bank figures, the contribution of the “petroleum fund” to the balance sheet
is excluded.
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National Bank, is on record as saying that “[a]s a result of the measures imple-
mented during the crisis, central banks took much more risk onto their balance
sheets, which could potentially lead to substantial losses” and “[t]here is no doubt
that central banks have to play a role in an economic crisis at the market level
as well as at the level of individual systemically important banks. In order to
act appropriately, they need room to maneuver, which implies a sound central
bank balance sheet with sufficient equity” (Jordan, 2012). These sentiments are
echoed by Klaas Knot (2013), Governor of the Dutch Central Bank,
The unprecedented expansion of central banks’ balance sheet since
the start of the crisis is certainly revealing. It shows that central
banks’ balance sheets are becoming more and more exposed to eco-
nomic risk and political pressure. Eventually, this may result in a sub-
stantial amount of negative capital in a central bank’s balance sheet.
This is undesirable, because it could undermine a central bank’s cred-
ibility and independence...An additional concern for central banks is
that unconventional monetary policy increasingly comes with some
sense of ‘public unease’ about the role central banks play...The fact
that criticism of central banks is creeping more and more into the
mainstream debate – whether or not this is justified – implies that
the public is looking increasingly critically at central banks. While
this may not put central bank independence or central banks’ room
for maneuver immediately at risk, it does signify that central banks
may need to step up their efforts on transparency and accountability.
The assets, or collateral, these central bankers are speaking of – that they have
absorbed into their balance sheets over the course of the crisis – and that they
are justly concerned about, is a consequence of the functioning of the collateral
frameworks that central banks themselves have designed and the unconventional
monetary policies they have pursued. The quotes above are therefore testament
to the importance of collateral frameworks. It is also suggestive of something
being not quite right about them. The central bankers seem to imply that their
collateral frameworks could be a source of risk that could create problems down
the road.
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2.5 Collateral
The discussion above points to the centrality of collateral with respect to mon-
etary policy and the market for liquidity. Because conditions in the market
for liquidity spill over to the broader financial markets, collateral and collateral
frameworks also matter for financial markets. Furthermore, collateral is now
more important than ever, in part because of the growth in central bank balance
sheets and in part because there is a regulatory/central bank push to collateral-
ize interbank transactions. This may create further tension between the usage of
collateral in transactions with the central bank versus other counterparties.
During the financial crisis, the ECB broadened the Eurosystem collateral
framework considerably, allowing a broader range of securities of the same credit
quality and allowing securities of lower ratings. A strand of the literature ad-
dresses the question as to what role the balance sheet of a central bank plays
(Hawkins, 2003; Bindseil, Manzanares, and Weller 2004; Caruana, 2011; and
Miles and Schanz, 2014) as well as asking whether a central bank can default or
impinge its credibility by weakening its balance sheet (Stella, 1997; Ernhagen,
Vesterlund, and Viotti, 2002; and Buiter, 2008). The recent revisiting of these
questions is a result of a concern in some quarters that central banks could be
at risk, at least from being able to implement effective policies. By allowing
riskier securities as collateral, the ECB has increased its risk, both in financial
and political terms, as emphasized by Klaas Knot.
Collateral also plays a direct role in the secondary market for liquidity, notably
in repos, and much research is devoted to this topic. As predicted by Duffie
(1996), the evidence shows that collateral that trades special in the repo market
also trades at a premium in the cash market (Jordan and Jordan, 1997, and
Buraschi and Menini, 2002). Not surprisingly, the risk of the underlying collateral
adversely affects the repo rate (Bartolini, Hilton, Sundaresan, and Tonetti, 2011).
Researchers have also asked the question as to whether the collateralization
of transactions in the market for liquidity affects financial stability. Intuitively,
collateral can be expected to have a stabilizing effect (Ewerhart and Tapking,
2008; Heider and Hoerova, 2009). However, theoretically, collateral can also turn
out to be destabilizing (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009) when it is combined with credit limits and shocks to asset values. Gorton
and Metrick (2012) argue that the financial crisis in the US was characterized
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by a run on bilateral repos with securitized assets as collateral. A run in this
case means an extreme increase in haircuts. Their main argument is that the
underlying securities became more risky and therefore more information sensitive
(Gorton and Metrick, 2010). Krishnamurty, Nagel, and Orlov (2014) disagree
with this view, arguing instead that the evidence is more consistent with a credit
crunch than with a run. However, these authors study different segments of the
repo market. Whatever the case, the evidence shows that repo markets were not
unaffected by the crisis and may well have played an integral part in it.
The evidence also shows that an increase in market risk is associated with
a shift towards safer collateral (Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer, 2014).
Thus, default risk appears to be a consideration in the repo market. Furthermore,
a shift towards higher quality collateral in secondary market repos may leave lower
quality collateral to be used in repos with the central bank. Safety concerns and
regulatory innovations such as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (BCBS, 2013a) are
likely to further increase banks’ demand for high quality assets. Thus, the efficient
use and potential re-use of collateral emerge as important considerations (Singh
and Stella, 2012; CGFS, 2013; Singh, 2013).
Collateral also plays an important role in real transactions (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989 and 1990; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). This literature establishes a link between collateralized borrowing and
asset prices and investments. Notably, the net worth of collateral impacts the
investment capability of a firm. This is analogous to a repo transaction, where
the form of collateral is not an asset or real estate but a security.
While there is a substantial literature on collateral, as sketched above, little
of this research looks directly at the design and consequences of a central bank’s
collateral framework. Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) show theoretically that al-
locational inefficiencies in the market for liquidity may depend on the size of the
set of eligible collateral, but do not consider collateral heterogeneity, which is a
crucial issue handled by collateral frameworks in practice. In another theoretical
contribution, Chapman, Chiu, and Molico (2011) show that haircuts in central
bank collateral frameworks can influence investment decisions; when haircuts on
illiquid assets are “too low,” an overinvestment in these may take place, leaving
the central bank at risk and reducing welfare. Related to this, Buiter and Sib-
ert (2005) and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010) argue that there may
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be an inverse relation between haircuts in repos with the central bank and the
secondary market prices of the underlying collateral. The latter paper provides
empirical evidence to back up this theoretical claim.
3 Collateral Frameworks
Central bank collateral frameworks are fundamental institutional features of the
monetary and financial system that have gone largely unstudied by researchers,
perhaps because they are simply taken for granted and seem of little consequence
in times of normalcy. They are also often complex and opaque, requiring the
studying of numerous legal documents to be accurately understood. Their basic
function is to define the set of eligible collateral financial institutions can use in
operations with central banks to obtain central bank money (liquidity). They also
determine the quantity of liquidity that a central bank will supply for each eligible
collateral, by, for example, setting haircuts in repos with eligible counterparties
(“banks”). This places collateral frameworks at the core of the monetary system
and the financial system that extends (from) it.
This section provides an overview of the role played by collateral frameworks,
with an emphasis on potential biases and distortions that may arise from their
design. I sketch out some theoretical issues and use the important case of the
Eurosystem’s collateral framework to shed light on how that particular frame-
work functions in practice. Further details are provided in Nyborg (2015), which
unpacks the legal rules of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework and brings to
light the practical implications of these rules through a forensic style empirical
investigation. The current section reviews some of the key findings of that in-
vestigation. A central characteristic of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework is
its broad eligibility criteria. Thus, the findings summarized in this paper are
especially relevant with respect to understanding potential issues that arise in
collateral frameworks sharing this characteristic. My general point is that col-
lateral frameworks have potentially far-reaching effects on financial markets and
the real economy. They are at the core of the monetary system and, as observed
by Bagehot (1873), “[m]oney is economical power.”
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3.1 Potential impact
There are several dimensions to the potential impact of collateral frameworks.
Because eligibilitymeans that a security can be refinanced through, or bought by,
the central bank, this can affect its repo rate, liquidity, and price in the secondary
market. The haircuts applied by the central bank to different collateral may be
set so that the impact of eligibility differs across asset classes and individual
securities, possibly by design or even inadvertently.
For instance, in order to make banks’ balance sheets more liquid, the central
bank can favor especially illiquid collateral by giving these relatively low haircuts.
While this may help channel liquidity “where it is needed,” a side effect is that it
may cause distortions in money and asset markets by reducing the role of market
discipline. In addition, an impairment in the efficiency of the market for liquidity
can spill over into the broader financial markets as shown by Nyborg and O¨stberg
(2014) and, from there, to the real economy.
Collateral frameworks that favor illiquid collateral may also stimulate the
endogenous production of it. In turn, this may lead to a misallocation of funds
in the real economy towards assets that are fundamentally less liquid in a real
sense, that is, assets that have very long-dated returns in terms of goods and
services.8
To follow the logic, it is important to understand that central banks control
central bank money, that is, nominal balances. If there is a low level of current
goods and services, there is little a central bank can do about it in the short run.
When we speak of collateral being illiquid, we typically mean this in a nominal
sense; selling it may involve accepting a discount in the price and the more so the
more one wishes to sell. While a policy of favoring illiquid collateral may serve a
useful purpose in some situations, it can also give rise to problems if this collateral
is also illiquid in a real sense, as seems plausible. Favoring illiquid collateral in the
collateral framework may then lead to an overproduction of illiquid real assets.
8This relates to Chapman, Chiu, and Molico’s (2011) result that low haircuts on illiquid
assets may tilt portfolios in that direction and also to the arguments of Buiter and Sibert (2005)
and Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2010) that haircuts affect prices. In turn, these can be
seen as special versions of Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) general point that portfolios may be
optimally tilted away from illiquid assets by agents that have more immediate liquidity needs.
However, these papers do not discuss nominal versus real liquidity or collateral frameworks as
such.
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Tilting the economy towards an overproduction of illiquid real assets is likely to
be inefficient and may exacerbate business cycles. A policy of favoring illiquid
collateral in a depressed economy may make it harder for the economy to recover.
Housing, especially second homes, is an example of illiquid real assets. The
real returns are long dated. Countries such as Spain and Ireland are still grappling
with the aftermath of a prolonged boom in house building. In the case of Spain,
much of this was touristic housing, including second-home villas and apartments
that stand empty much of the time. Below, I will address whether the collateral
framework in the Eurosystem favors illiquid collateral.
The banking literature has raised the issue that banks may be underincen-
tivized to channel funds to assets that are liquid in a real sense because of a
free-rider problem among them. In particular, as emphasized by Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987), the provisioning of liquidity is a public good. Thus, if liquid
investments have lower returns than less liquid ones, banks have an incentive
to free-ride on other banks. When each bank relies on other banks to promote
liquid, low return investments, the end result is an underprovisioning of “real
liquidity” in the system as a whole.9 A central bank that attempts to offset the
problem of an underprovisioning of real liquidity by providing nominal balances
on favorable terms to illiquid real assets does not solve the free-rider problem,
but exacerbates it. Thus, a collateral framework that favors illiquid collateral
may ultimately promote a misallocation of funds in the real economy because
it affects individual banks’ incentives seen in isolation, as discussed above, and
also enhances the free-rider problem among banks with respect to the private
provisioning of liquidity.
Collateral frameworks can also impinge on market discipline and bank’s in-
centives to monitor creditors by accepting collateral that does not trade at all.
They can support the influence of politics on banks and the financial system by
9The distinction between “liquid” and “illiquid” assets in Bhattacharya and Gale’s (1987)
is based on the timing of returns in terms of goods or services. “Liquid” assets are ones with
a relatively low duration. In other words, “liquidity” in their analysis refers to assets that are
liquid in a real sense. For the most part, the theoretical banking literature has not considered
the real-world distinction between nominal and real assets. Most of the literature is written
in terms of real assets, ignoring money and the vital function of banks in the money creation
process. Some exceptions are Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996), Allen and Gale (1998),
Diamond and Rajan (2006), Skeie (2008), and Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2014).
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extending favorable terms to collateral with local, regional, or central government
guarantees. Haircut rules and guarantee policies can interact to increase market
segmentation. Collateral framework can facilitate indirect bailouts, propping up
poorly performing banks that should optimally be resolved instead.
What a central bank accepts in exchange for central bank money also affects
its own balance sheet. Perceived weaknesses in a central bank’s balance sheet
can ultimately affect agents’ trust in it, its money, and even the political body or
bodies, that created and support the central bank. Witness the “end the Fed”
and “back to gold” movements in the US and the numerous calls to break up the
euro.10 The threat to the euro has been real enough to lead the ECB to engage
in a prolonged battle to save it. Many commentators have expressed the view
that a break-up of the euro will also mean a break-up of the European Union.
This underscores the importance of sound monetary policies, including sound
collateral frameworks.
3.2 Collateral eligibility and usage in the euro area
In most currency areas, central bank money is provided to banks against a wide
set of eligible collateral with potentially different liquidity and risk character-
istics (ECB, 2013; BIS, 2013). The set of eligible collateral in the euro area
is especially large. At times, more than 40,000 ISINs have been on the public
list of eligible “marketable” collateral, with the number over time being around
30–40,000 ISINs.11 The set of eligible collateral ranges from sovereign bonds to
unsecured bank bonds and asset backed securities, with a large span of ratings
within all asset classes. At the end of 2013, these had a value of around EUR
14 trillion, having grown from approximately EUR 7.7 billion at the end of 2004
(see, e.g., Nyborg, 2015). Banks can also pledge non-marketable assets such as
credit claims. Guarantees by governments, corporations, and other entities can
be, and are, used to provide eligibility to otherwise non-eligible collateral. “Mar-
10See, e.g., Paul (2009) and a Bloomberg National Poll in 2010 in which 16% of the respon-
dents said the Federal Reserve should be abolished (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
12-09/more-than-half-of-americans-want-fed-reined-in-or-abolished.html), or “House Republi-
cans Resume Efforts to Reduce Fed’s Power,” by Binyamin Appelbaum, New York Times,
July 10, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/business/house-republicans-restart-their-
waron-the-fed.html?).
11ISIN is International Securities Identification Number.
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ketable” collateral without such guarantees or external ratings can be made pri-
vately eligible through the use of approved in-house ratings. The same collateral
is eligible across all operations, main and long term refinancing operations and
the marginal lending facility (discount window) alike. The Eurosystem therefore
offers an ideal setting for gaining insight into collateral frameworks with broad
eligibility criteria, in addition to being important in its own right.12
Insert Figure 3 here.
Figure 3 provides evidence on the production and usage of eligible collateral in
repos with the Eurosystem from 2004 to 2013. The data underlying the graphs is
taken from the ECB’s webpage. Over this time period, the outstanding amount
of central bank money injected in repos grew from EUR 345.1 to 717.1 billion,
having peaked in 2012 at EUR 1.1 trillion. Over the same time, Eurosystem
holdings of euro denominated securities issued by euro area entities grew from
EUR 70.2 to 586.1 billion.13
The ECB provides the data broken down into seven asset classes. These
are, from bottom to top in the figure: central government securities, regional
government securities, covered bank bonds, corporate bonds, uncovered bank
bonds, asset backed securities, and “other marketable assets.” As will be seen in
Table 1, collateral haircuts in the Eurosystem are increasing in these asset classes
in the order just cited. Thus, we can think of them as representing collateral of
decreasing “quality” in terms of risk and liquidity, as reflected by haircuts.14
The figure contains two graphs, one for nominal values of eligible marketable
collateral (3a) and one for usage of marketable and non-marketable assets (3b).
The different asset classes are color coordinated, to lump them into three broad
categories. The “higher quality” collateral is indicated by blue colors. This is
comprised of central and regional government securities.15 The “medium quality”
12The Federal Reserve System also has wide eligibility criteria, but restricts the securities
it accepts at its open market operations to Treasury, agency, and agency mortgaged-backed
securities (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012; BIS, 2013). For further
details on Eurosystem eligibility criteria, see Eberl and Weber (2014) and Nyborg (2015).
13This is as tabulated in Nyborg (2015), Table 3, which also provides further details. The
original data can be found on the ECB’s webpage.
14A caveat: it is unclear what securities the category “other marketable assets” represents,
although I bundle them with “lower quality” collateral.
15Given the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, it can clearly be argued that not all
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collateral is indicated by red colors, this is comprised of covered bank bonds and
corporate bonds. Third, the “lower quality” collateral is indicated by green colors
and is composed of uncovered bank bonds, asset backed securities, and other
marketable assets. When looking at usage, the “green” category of lower quality
collateral is augmented by non-marketable assets.
Figure 3 shows that the Eurosystem’s collateral framework promotes lower
quality collateral. Over time, asset backed securities, uncovered bank bonds,
and other “lower quality” marketable assets have become an increasingly larger
proportion of the eligible marketable collateral. The increased production of
such “low-end” collateral is a logical response to another trend, namely that
these collateral classes have become increasingly attractive to use in repos with
the Eurosystem, as revealed by the large increase in their usage. From 2004 to
2013, the proportion of these low-end asset classes and non-marketable assets
used in repos with the Eurosystem has grown from around 35% to close to 60%
by value.16
That banks use a relatively high proportion of lower quality collateral in
Eurosystem liquidity injecting operations might be seen as the natural result of
the efficient use of collateral by banks. Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002)
argue that there is heterogeneity in the opportunity costs among the collateral
that is eligible to be used in Eurosystem repos which is not eliminated by haircuts.
This may arise, for example, as a result of Eurosystem haircuts not reflecting
market conditions. Consistent with this view, Nyborg (2015) documents that
months and years pass between each time Eurosystem haircuts are updated.
That banks use relatively worse collateral in ECB operations suggests that lower
quality collateral have relatively low haircuts (adjusted for risk and illiquidity).
Lower quality collateral may also have lower opportunity costs because of their
limited use outside of Eurosystem operations. In addition to the approximately
EUR 14 trillion (end of 2013) of eligible collateral that is marketable, banks can
also use non-marketable collateral, with unknown aggregate value. In compar-
ison, at the end of 2013, the refinancing operations soaked up collateral with a
government debt is of high quality. Here, this is not taken into account.
16An ECB working paper by Bindseil and Papadia (2006) notes a similar trend in the 1999
to 2005 period as does an IMF working paper by Chailloux, Gray, and McCaughrin (2008) for
the 2004 to 2007 period. The latter paper also shows a similar phenomenon occurring in the
US with the onset of the financial crisis in the third quarter of 2007.
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collateral value of less than one trillion. Thus, there is a large excess quantity of
eligible collateral, some of which is locked out of other markets. For example, the
popular Eurex GC Pooling ECB basket contracts include only around 7–8,000
ISINs of the roughly 35,000 ISINs that can be used in Eurosystem repos.17
In addition, banks may have a preference for using higher quality collateral in
bilateral repos as this saves on default costs. In particular, Ewerhart and Tapking
(2008) argue that two-way default risk is an important consideration in bilateral
repos. While larger haircuts have the advantage of protecting cash providers
against defaults by cash takers (collateral providers), they have the drawback of
leading to larger losses to collateral providers in the event that cash providers fail
to return the underlying collateral at maturity. This gives rise to a preference
for using higher quality collateral in bilateral repos, since such collateral requires
lower haircuts to protect the cash provider from cash taker credit risk (assuming
default costs are positively related to losses in default). In short, higher quality
collateral reduces the total costs of two-way credit risk. The flip side of this is a
preference for using lower quality collateral in repos with the central bank. Doing
so is possible, of course, only in a system where the central bank does not require
the highest quality collateral, as is the case in the euro area.
3.3 Determinants of collateral values
Banks’ preference for particular types of collateral in repos with the central banks
is affected by the terms offered by the central bank. In the euro area, the repo
rate is independent of the counterparty and the collateral that is being used.
However, haircuts vary across eligible collateral. Haircuts therefore play a key
role in the collateral framework.
Haircuts are applied, in principle, to the market value of eligible collateral to
yield a collateral’s collateral value. The collateral value is the amount that an
eligible institution (which I refer to as a bank, for short) can borrow from the
central bank with the specified collateral. For a specific eligible collateral i at
time t, the collateral value, V ci,t, is given by
V ci,t = (1− hi,t)V
m
i,t , (1)
17See http://www.eurexrepo.com/repo-en/products/gcpooling/. Eurex acts as a central
clearing party (CCP) in these contracts.
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where hi,t is the haircut and V
m
i,t is, in principle, the market price of the collateral.
I say “in principle” because not all eligible collateral have market prices. Where a
market price does not exist or is not sufficiently reliable, the central bank applies
the haircut to a theoretical, or model, price instead. Thus, we can think of V m
equally as a model or market price.
Questions that naturally arise from these observations include: What are
haircuts for different eligible collateral and how are they determined? What
determines whether a market or a theoretical price is used? What does a market
price actually mean, for example, how recent must it be to count or what kind
of volume must it be good for? What fraction of all eligible collateral has a
theoretical “market” price for the purpose of calculating collateral values?
Nyborg (2015) addresses these questions and documents, among other things,
that around 77% by count and around 17% by value, of all eligible collateral
have prices that are theoretically determined, rather than taken from the market
(estimated, using the official collateral framework pricing rules and Bloomberg as
a data source). By way of comparison, banks use well below 10%, by value, of the
eligible collateral in repos with the Eurosystem. The percentage of collateral with
theoretical prices is higher for lower quality collateral, which may help explain
the heavy usage of such collateral, as seen in Figure 3.
Figure 4 unpacks (1) to highlight the elements that determine collateral values
in the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. Markets affect collateral values directly
when a market price of the underlying collateral exists, but non-market factors
are also very important.
Insert Figure 4 here.
First, haircuts are not determined in a market but directly by the ECB. As
seen in (1), haircuts have a direct effect on collateral values. They potentially
also have an indirect effect because a collateral’s haircut in Eurosystem operations
may impact on its market value, for example as argued by Ashcraft, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2010). Nyborg (2015) provides an empirical example that supports
this view.
Second, ratings affect every aspect of the collateral value calculation. Haircuts
are directly affected by them. Market prices also tend to respond to ratings. They
are also likely to be an input to the model used to calculate theoretical prices,
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when that is necessary (but the theoretical models used by the Eurosystem are
not publicly available). This gives rating agencies substantial influence. Unfor-
tunately, there is evidence that competition for business among rating agencies
often leads to a “race to the bottom,” i.e., the rating agency most likely to give
the highest rating wins the business (see, e.g., White, 2010, for an overview).
But ratings may also be derived from internal models (approved by individual
countries’ national central banks).
Third, ratings may be affected by guarantees provided to specific collateral
or issuers by sovereigns and other players. This opens the door for politics to
influence collateral values, since government guarantees may involve politics in
some form or another. Guarantees can also influence haircuts directly. Nyborg
(2015) provides further details on the role of ratings and guarantees.
In addition to these points, the influence of markets in determining collateral
values is reduced by the fact that the ECB accepts a large number of securities
that are trading on non-regulated markets as well as non-marketable collateral,
for which market prices by definition do not exist. In short, markets play a
potentially limited role when it comes to determining collateral values.
3.4 Euroystem haircuts
As stated above, Eurosystem haircuts are not drawn from the market, but set
by the ECB. Although they reflect risk and liquidity, they do not reflect day-
to-day, or even month-to-month, changes in market conditions, because they are
so rarely revised. Nyborg (2015) documents that, historically, the average time
between revisions is more than three years.
Insert Table 1 here.
By way of example, Table 1 summarizes the haircut rules for marketable
eligible collateral that have been in effect since October 1, 2013. As seen, the
ECB’s haircut policy (and collateral framework) is built around five liquidity
categories, namely:18 I. Central government and central bank debt; II. Local
and regional government debt, jumbo covered bonds (pfandbrief), agency and
supranational debt instruments; III. Traditional pfandbrief and corporate debt;
18As of October 1, 2013, the ECB refers to the liquidity categories as “haircut categories.”
Here, I continue to use the older “liquidity category” terminology.
21
IV. Unsecured bank bonds; and V. Asset-backed securities. For the same residual
maturity and coupon policy (zero, fixed, or floating), haircuts are increasing in
the liquidity category, with the exception of inverse floaters for which haircuts
are the same across liquidity categories. The table also shows that there are two
rating categories for eligible collateral, namely, above A- and BBB- to BBB+ (on
the S&P scale), with the lower rating category resulting in a higher haircut.19
The haircut policy of the ECB can be summarized as follows:
ECB haircut policy: General features
1. Haircuts are rarely revised over time. Thus, they do not depend on market
conditions at particular points in time.
2. Haircuts increase in asset class illiquidity, as measured by the liquidity cat-
egory.
3. Haircuts increase in risk, as captured by the duration.20
4. Haircuts increase in risk, as captured by the rating. There are two rating
categories.21
5. Within asset classes (liquidity categories), controlling for duration and the
two rating categories, there is little differentiation in haircuts between dif-
ferent eligible collateral.
6. Haircuts do not depend on the counterparty.22
While the liquidity categories are intended to reflect different liquidity levels,
they might also reflect different risk levels. For example, the least liquid category,
asset backed securities (V), arguably consists of riskier securities than the most
liquid group (I), central government bonds and central bank debt instruments.
19Nyborg (2015) provides further details on the haircuts on non-marketable collateral, which
tend to be larger than those of marketable collateral.
20Specifically, they increase in the residual maturity of the collateral and are higher for zero
coupon bonds than comparable bonds with fixed coupons.
21Prior to October 25, 2008, eligible collateral needed a rating of at least A-, (on the S&P
scale).
22There is one exception to this, namely the additional haircuts introduced as of October
1, 2013 for “own-use” collateral. “Own use” refers to collateral issued by a counterparty with
which the bank that uses it has “close links.” Details on this are provided by Nyborg (2015).
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For example, as noted by Calomiris (2009), ratings across asset classes are not
comparable with respect to default probabilities.23 Of course, developments in the
euro area have shown that, in many cases, risk and illiquidity can be substantial
for central government bonds as well.
The low level of market input in determining haircuts and the large number
of collateral without market prices can help explain why preferences for using
particular asset classes arise and how this can persist and even strengthen over
time.
Although Eurosystem haircuts are not much affected by the markets, the
reverse is not true. Haircuts in the secondary repo market are often taken directly
from the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. In Nyborg (2015), I examine Eurex’
important GC Pooling contracts. These repos are based on a subset of the eligible
collateral in Eurosystem operations. According to Eurex officials, they set the
haircuts in this contract based on those of the Eurosystem, but may increase
them for particular collateral that is perceived to be especially risky. I find that
Eurex uses the same haircuts as the ECB in around 93% of cases. This is a simple
piece of evidence that shows that the Eurosystem’s collateral framework affects
markets.
3.5 Ratings, guarantees, and further issues
In Nyborg (2015), I use official European Union/ECB documentation on the Eu-
rosystem’s collateral framework to provide a comprehensive summary of haircuts
over time, including the haircuts of different types of non-marketable collateral.
The role of ratings and guarantees in determining eligibility and haircuts is also
examined in detail. The rules give rise to a set of natural questions that are ex-
amined through various pieces of data in what can be characterized as a forensic
style analysis.
Issues that are examined include the distribution of eligible collateral and their
ratings across different asset classes, the relation between primary market and
secondary market haircuts, the impact of haircuts on secondary market yields,
cross-collateral haircut inconsistencies, the role of rating agencies, the usage and
23 Calomiris reports that according to Moody’s, in 2005 five year default probabilities were
10 times larger for Baa rated CDOs than for Baa rated corporate bonds, the numbers being
20% and 2%, respectively.
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timing of government guarantees, and the incidence of eligible “marketable” col-
lateral without market prices. The broad-theme conclusions that emerge are that
the collateral framework of the Eurosystem is biased towards low quality collat-
eral, does not actively use markets but instead impinges on market discipline,
and, in conjunction with the full allotment policy, has been used to facilitate
indirect bailouts over the course of the crisis. Some of the more specific findings
are as follows.
First, by way of background: as of October 2008, eligible collateral is put
into two ratings categories, (i) A- or higher (using Standard & Poor’s scale), and
(ii) BBB+ to BBB-, with haircuts in the lower category being higher. The vast
majority (around 85% by count, 90% by value) of eligible collateral is rated A-
or higher, thus receiving the lower haircuts.
Second, by way of background: Until 2009, the accepted external rating agen-
cies were Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Fitch, and Moody’s. In 2009, Dominion Bond
Rating Services (DBRS) was added to that list. Only the highest rating counts in
Eurosystem operations. I document that DBRS has been pivotal in providing an
A- rating for Italy, Ireland, and Spain, and a BBB- rating for Portugal. I estimate
that the lower haircuts on government bond from these countries as a result of
the pivotal ratings by DBRS is worth around EUR 200-300 billion in increased
collateral value. This is especially notable as it is under the full allotment policy,
meaning that the full increase in collateral value is available as funding from the
Eurosystem. This underscores the important role of DBRS in the Eurosystem’s
indirect bailout of the weaker sovereigns.
Third, government guarantees are widely used, with the majority of credit
institutions with such guarantees being Italian. The usage of government guar-
antees is unfortunate as it strengthens the nexus between governments and banks
and may contribute to market fragmentation. The total value of the guaranteed
collateral (from the Italian government to Italian credit institutions) amounts
to more than EUR 80 billion and the marginal effect is to increase their total
collateral value by around EUR 30 billion. Approximately 50% of this is due to
the A- rating given to Italy by DBRS.
Figure 5 traces out the number of Italian and non-Italian credit institutions
with government guaranteed eligible collateral (on the public list). The vertical
dotted lines mark the dates of the two three-year LTROs that, as discussed in
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Section 2, provided a total of 1.1 trillion in funding to banks.
Insert Figure 5 here.
Figure 5 illustrates four points. (i) The number of Italian credit institutions
with government guarantees increased rapidly from close to zero to more than 250
over a few days prior to the second three-year LTRO. (ii) The number of Italian
credit institutions with government guarantees remained stable until spring/early
summer of 2014, when it fell to just below 200. This is still a large number. (iii)
The number of non-Italian credit institutions with government guaranteed eligible
collateral has decreased steadily from before the first three-year LTRO to the
spring of 2014. (iv) Since shortly before the second three-year LTRO, there have
been substantially more Italian credit institutions with government guarantees
than non-Italian ones. This speaks to a severe worsening of the credit worthiness
of the banking sector in Italy over the period covered here. It suggests that the
three-year LTROs, and the indirect bailout these represented, were especially
important for the Italian banking sector.
Fourth, in the run-up to the second three-year LTRO, the ECB weakened col-
lateral eligibility criteria by admitting 10,516 securities trading on non-regulated
markets to the public list of eligible collateral. This increased the number of
French and Italian eligible collateral by 198.5% and 70.8%, respectively. Practi-
cally all of this newly admitted collateral were unsecured bank bonds. Spanish,
Italian, and French banks had by far the largest uptake in the three-year LTROs,
in that order.
Fifth, the announcement on September 4, 2014 that the ECB would purchase
asset backed securities and covered bonds, with an aggregate size that was be-
lieved at the time to be around EUR 1 trillion, was accompanied by abnormally
large stock returns in the euro area. But these were not spread equally across
countries. The largest stock returns were seen in the same countries that have
benefited from high ratings from DBRS – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain
– as well as Greece. These countries’ bank stocks reacted especially positively.
The event study findings are consistent with the purchase program being a part
of an indirect bailout especially targeting the financially weaker sovereigns and
their banks. Nyborg (2015) discusses at length the hypothesis that the ECB’s
unconventional monetary policies over the course of the crisis have served this
role.
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4 Market Discipline
Market forces and discipline are important notions in the context of collateral
frameworks for several reasons. As illustrated by equation (1) and Figure 4,
collateral values are determined by applying haircuts to, in principle, market
prices. Furthermore, market discipline is typically viewed as an important com-
plement to financial regulation. It is one of the three pillars in both the Basel II
and III bank regulation frameworks (BCBS, 2011). The idea is that banks, like
other enterprises, should be regulated not only through formal regulatory rules,
but through the competitive forces of the market. More generally, market and
competitive forces are central to the efficient allocation of capital and resources.
We would expect this principle to be relevant also in the case of the market for
liquidity.
An issue raised in this article, however, is that markets are utilized to a rela-
tively small degree by the Eurosystem’s collateral framework. Indeed, it appears
that many features of the framework are designed to circumvent market disci-
pline. Nyborg (2015) and the findings reviewed in Section 3 offer much by way of
detail that speaks to this. The current section distills these findings and discusses
some of the consequences of the relative lack of market discipline allowed for by
the Euroystem’s collateral framework.
4.1 Market discipline impairment
Several features of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework impinge on market
discipline.
First, non-marketable assets are included in the set of eligible collateral. Thus,
banks can obtain liquidity without having themselves or their assets assessed in
the market. The evidence shows that the usage of non-marketable collateral has
increased in the euro area over time, reaching approximately 10% in 2007 and
more than 20% in 2011 where it has remained (Figure 3).
Second, a substantial fraction of marketable collateral on the public list of
eligible collateral trades on non-regulated markets. The evidence shows that
the incidence of theoretical prices is much higher for collateral trading on non-
regulated markets than for other collateral.
Third, around 77%, by count, of the close to 35,000 ISINs on the public list of
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eligible collateral do not have market prices. By value, the fraction with missing
market prices is around 17%.24 These estimates come from feeding all ISINs
on the public list of eligible collateral on selected dates into Bloomberg. This
platform is perhaps the most important source of current market data in the
financial industry. The large incidence of collateral on the public list without
market prices in Bloomberg is strong support for the thesis that market forces
and discipline are not central pillars of the Eurosystem’s collateral framework.
Fourth, stale market prices are also a part of the collateral framework for the
purpose of determining collateral values. In particular, market prices can be up
to five days old. Collateral without a price movement over five days have their
prices and therefore collateral values determined theoretically.
Fifth, with respect to determining market prices of eligible collateral, there
is no official rule that addresses depth, that is, the volume observed prices are
good for. This opens up the possibility of manipulating the prices of thinly
traded eligible collateral. This can also affect theoretical prices, since these must
necessarily be based on prices of comparable securities. The lack of market depth
is especially a concern for illiquid collateral that, by definition, have low volumes.
Sixth, in Eurosystem operations, a bank is allowed to use collateral issued by
an entity with which it has close links. The rules with respect to such “own-use”
have become increasingly lenient over the course of the crisis.
Seventh, Eurosystem haircuts are set by the ECB rather than determined
in the market. Indeed, influence appears to flow in the reverse direction, with
the fixed haircuts set by the ECB being adopted by some segments of the mar-
ket. Nyborg (2015) also provides an example that Eurosystem haircuts influence
market prices of eligible collateral, with larger haircuts reducing prices, ceteris
paribus.
Eighth, revisions to Eurosystem haircuts are rare. The average time between
new overall haircut rules is more than three years, but some classes of collateral
have not had their haircuts changed over the almost eleven year period, March
2014 to January 2015.
Ninth, the only market, or near-market, based information that affects hair-
cuts is ratings by external rating agencies (since October 2008). However, there
24This may be an underestimate because many ISINs have an outstanding value of zero in
the Bloomberg system.
27
is no aggregation of ratings by different agencies. Instead, except for ABSs, only
the highest rating matters (“highest-rating rule”), which invites ratings shopping
and catering.25
There are four accepted rating agencies, S&P, Fitch, Moody’s, and DBRS.
The inclusion of DBRS to this list in 2009 has contributed to higher ratings. A
purely statistical effect is that the distribution of the highest rating shifts to the
right as one adds agencies (unless rating agencies become more conservative as
one adds competitors to their business). In addition, as evidenced from sovereign
ratings, DBRS also gives higher ratings than the other agencies. It has been
pivotal in giving Italy, Spain, and Ireland A- ratings and Portugal a BBB- rating
over several years. No other agency has been pivotal for a country rated by
DBRS.
Tenth, there are only two ratings categories for the purpose of setting haircuts
for eligible collateral, above A- and BBB+ to BBB-. The ineffectiveness of ratings
as a tool by which to differentiate haircuts can be seen from the finding that the
vast majority of marketable eligible collateral on the public list are rated A- or
higher, the percentage being approximately 85% by count and 90% by value.
This is surprising, but may be the result of the highest-rating rule.
Eleventh, collateral with ratings below BBB- are in principle not eligible, but
exemptions from this rule for sovereign bonds with lower ratings are standard.26
Twelfth, while a rating from an approved external rating agency, either for the
issue, the issuer, or the guarantor, is necessary to be on the public list, collateral
can also be made eligible privately through the use of a national central bank
(NCB) or approved in-house or third party rating. It is not clear how much such
“privately eligible” collateral exists or is used, but one could venture a guess that
the “other marketable collateral” category in Figure 3 represents such collateral.
Figure 3 shows that this category has increased over the course of the crisis, but
was also used in the pre-crisis years. The collateral framework recognizes that
banks have an incentive to shop around for the most favorable model or tweak
their own model, by not allowing banks to use more than one model per year
(ECB, 2006/12). This is implicit recognition that private ratings models pose a
25For ABSs, the most recent rule is that the second highest rating is what matters.
26Greece and Cyprus have received exemptions. No other euro area country has been rated
below BBB-. However, the lowering of the ratings floor to BBB- took place as sovereign ratings
started to come under pressure following Lehman’s bankruptcy.
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potential problem. Given the abundance of eligible collateral on the public list,
it is an open question as to why privately eligible collateral is allowed.
Thirteenth, guarantees can be used to boost ratings. This reduces the role
of markets and potentially enhances the role of politics. Government guarantees
increased greatly in advance of the second three-year LTRO in February 2012,
especially in Italy (Figure 5). The run up to this LTRO also saw the inclusion
of more than 10,000 securities trading on non-regulated markets into the set of
eligible collateral.
The full allotment policy introduced in October 2008 enhances these potential
sources of market discipline impairment. This is so because, under this policy,
banks can obtain all the liquidity and funding they wish directly from the central
bank. Banks are only constrained by the value of their collateral within the
Eurosystem, as determined by equation (1). The quantity of central bank money
has increased substantially after the introduction of the full allotment policy,
thus placing more demands on collateral and magnifying the distortions that
arise from the impairment of market forces.
4.2 Biases and systemic arbitrage
As discussed in above, the collateral framework in the euro area is biased towards
what we can think of as lower quality collateral. There appears to be a preference,
or bias, towards the usage of more illiquid and risky collateral that has increased
over time. The production of lower quality collateral has increased as well.
These findings are consistent with the anecdotal evidence that there is a peck-
ing order for the use of collateral as follows:
• Lowest quality collateral used with central bank.
• Intermediate quality collateral used in CCP repos.
• Best quality collateral used in bilateral repos.
This pecking order must reflect the efficient use of collateral by banks. That the
lowest quality collateral is used in repos with the Eurosystem may, in part, result
from CCPs not accepting the very worst collateral and, in part, that two-sided
credit risk in bilateral repos tend to favor higher quality collateral, as discussed
in Section 3. But it is also likely a reflection of collateral values in Eurosystem
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repos being relatively high for low quality collateral, since banks have an incentive
to use collateral in repos with the central bank that is valued relatively highly
within the collateral framework as compared to in the markets.
We can say that the collateral framework provides the banks with an opportu-
nity for engaging in collateral arbitrage vis-a`-vis the central bank. Banks can use
the worst quality collateral in repos with the Eurosystem to obtain central bank
money and then turn around and reallocate that liquidity amongst themselves,
saving on the best quality collateral in the process. This can also be thought of as
a form of systemic arbitrage by the banks in aggregate, since they are essentially
arbitraging the monetary system. Empirical support for this view is provided by
Fecht, Nyborg, Rocholl, and Woschitz (2015), using detailed bank-level data.
Equation (1) shows that relatively high collateral values of low quality collat-
eral can result from relatively small haircuts or relatively large prices. Haircuts
are under the control of the central bank. For the most illiquid collateral, prices
are also ultimately controlled by the central bank since such collateral has its
price determined theoretically. Hence, the more illiquid the collateral, the bigger
is the role of the central bank in setting the collateral value. Given the preference
for using illiquid collateral in repos with the Eurosystem, this suggests that the
Eurosystem is especially generous when it comes to illiquid collateral.
Such central bank generosity may well be the result of a deliberate intent to
“channel liquidity where it is needed.” The preference can get stronger over time,
as the evidence suggests is the case, if the gap in liquidity between more liquid
and less liquid collateral increases. This is so because haircuts are stale and,
more generally, because haircuts and collateral values do not respond much to
market forces, as discussed above. These features of the collateral framework also
mean that the bias can increase over time through banks’ (endogenously) creating
illiquid collateral to take advantage of the good terms on such collateral on offer
in Eurosystem repos. This is especially a concern under the full allotment policy.
It is also important to note that a direct corollary of a central bank policy to
directly “channel liquidity where it is needed” is that interbank trade, and thereby
market discipline, is undermined.
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4.3 Potential costs
The undermining of market discipline in the market for liquidity means that mar-
ket signals are obscured, thus making supervisors’ and regulators’ job harder. The
bias towards lower quality collateral that the Eurosystem’s collateral framework
appears to promote has several additional implications. These issues are of in-
creasing importance as the volume of central bank repos grows under the full
allotment policy.
For example, as discussed in Section 3, favoring illiquid collateral in central
bank repos may stimulate the production of such collateral and distort invest-
ments in the real economy away from assets that are liquid in a real sense. A
contributing factor to such distortions is the free-rider problem inherent in the
private provision of liquidity (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). A collateral frame-
work that is biased in favor of illiquid financial assets can exacerbate this free-
rider problem, especially if these assets are also illiquid in a real sense, as seems
plausible. In other words, favoring illiquid financial assets through the collateral
framework can lead to suboptimal investment decisions and intertemporal con-
sumption patterns. In more plain language, it can contribute to an amplification
of business cycles.
In addition, promoting illiquid collateral through the collateral framework
can also make the banking, and financial, system more vulnerable to liquidity
shocks. Several authors have suggested that the breakdown in the interbank
market during the financial crisis was related to increased levels of information
asymmetry among banks with respect to the quality of their balance sheets (see,
e.g., Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen, 2009). A collateral framework that is
biased towards more illiquid collateral can make such a systemic crisis more
likely.
The promotion of lower quality collateral also weakens the balance sheet of
the central bank. This can make the central bank less able to respond to problems
in the banking system and, in extreme scenarios, undermine its credibility. One
typically thinks of the soundness of the central bank as being important for
the well functioning of the financial system. For example, Stella (1997, p. 33)
concludes that a weak and deteriorating central bank balance sheet is likely to
lead to price instability or financial repression. Stella (2005) also emphasizes
the importance of the strength of the balance sheet to maintain central bank
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independence and thus support the credibility of its policies (see also Sims, 2004,
and Jeanne and Svensson, 2007). In the euro area, it is hard to predict the
outcome of the turmoil that is likely to ensue should the ECB or one of the
national central banks need recapitalization.
As noted in Section 2, central bankers such as Thomas Jordan and Klaas Knot,
among others, have also expressed concern about increasingly weak central bank
balance sheets over the course of the crisis. Klaas Knot goes as far as saying
that weak balance sheets can “...undermine a central bank’s credibility...” and
that “...central banks may need to step up their efforts on transparency and
accountability” (Knot, 2013). Given this view, it is notable that the Eurosystem’s
collateral framework promotes risky and illiquid collateral.
A weak central bank can also affect economic activity negatively because
economic agents start to lose faith in the central bank’s money and the financial
system it supports. As suggested by Nyborg (2011), we can think of the assets of
a central bank as representing the “gold” that backs up the money. Reductions
in the value or liquidity of those assets, like the debasement of gold coins, can
result in reduced faith in the central bank’s money. In turn, this can lead to a
lower willingness to trade and invest. The recent crisis can be seen as an example
of this, with the price of gold and other commodities skyrocketing while the
economy went into deep recession.
A final important feature of the collateral framework in the euro area that
has the potential to create distortions is that haircuts are independent of the
counterparty. Individual banks’ credit risk is not taken into account. Such a
policy may well be justified as “levelling the playing field” by providing access to
liquidity at similar terms (but against heterogeneous collateral). It could also be
justified on logistical grounds, given that there are 30–40,000 eligible ISINs and
thousands of banks. However, a counterparty-independent haircut policy also
creates the potential for distortions because it provides incentives for a bank to
submit collateral whose default probability is highly correlated with a default of
the bank itself (Fecht, Nyborg, Rocholl, and Woschitz, 2015). This may well be
the largest concern for the central bank with respect to its own solidity.
The incentive created by the collateral framework to use highly correlated
collateral may have contributed to the increasing level of segmentation across
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countries in the euro area.27 Probabilities of sovereign defaults increased signifi-
cantly over the crisis, as evidenced by the sovereign debt crisis (and the accompa-
nying increase in yield spreads between Germany and other sovereigns), and the
solvency of a bank in a particular country is more closely linked to the solvency
of that country than that of another country. The increasing use of guarantees
from governments to credit institutions in the same country tightens this bond.
Government guarantees thereby also contribute to segmentation.
Fragmented markets are unattractive as they are a hindrance to the free flow
of capital. That fragmentation may also represent increased bank default prob-
abilities is an additional cause for concern. Worries about market fragmentation
were an important driver behind the push for a European Banking Union. As
observed by Benoit Cœure´, member of the executive board of the ECB, in the
context of the establishment of the European Banking Union “The negative feed-
back loop between banks and sovereigns as well as signs of market fragmentation
made European leaders take an extraordinary decision last summer, namely to
establish the European Banking Union.” (Cœure´, 2013).
To summarize, there are numerous features of the Eurosystem’s collateral
framework that impair market discipline. The more market forces are neutralized,
the more likely it is that the committees that decide on haircuts and theoretical
“market prices” get it wrong, leading in the first instance to financial market
distortions as well as influencing bank behavior.
The evidence suggests that the collateral framework is biased towards lower
quality collateral. This affects the balance sheet of the Eurosystem. It also
affects banks because the collateral framework provides a set of incentive con-
straints with respect to the behavior of banks and bankers. In turn this must
necessarily affect the real economy, since the money creation process is intimately
linked to the channeling of funds to the real economy. Because these biases were
present pre-crisis, it may well be that they have been a contributing factor to the
prolonged problems in the euro area. An important question that is raised by the
discussion in this section is to what extent it is desirable to design and use col-
lateral frameworks to favor certain assets or institutions or encourage particular
behavior.
27For evidence on fragmentation in the euro area, see, for example, ECB (2012), ECB (2014),
van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013), Al-Eyd and Berkmen (2013), and Acharya and Steffen (2015).
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5 Concluding remarks
Well functioning monetary and financial systems are important to the efficient
flow of resources and private and social welfare. This point has been brought
home emphatically by the global financial crisis and accompanying recession that
emerged in August 2007 and that has taken years to resolve. As late as January
2015, the ECB was still heavily engaged in its fight to preserve the euro. Nu-
merous proposals have been advanced regarding how to “fix” the monetary and
financial systems and regulate banks and other types of monetary and financial
enterprises. Widespread financial market interventions by central banks have
made it difficult to gauge “correct” market prices and, in private, even many
central bankers express this exact view. This undermines the efficient alloca-
tion of resources in the economy. Improving our understanding of the workings
of the monetary and financial system is therefore of central and, also urgent,
importance.
The broad perspective put forth in this article and in Nyborg (2015) is that
monetary and financial systems are fundamentally built on top of the collateral
that central banks choose to accept in exchange for central bank money. To
understand money and the broader financial system, it is therefore necessary to
understand central bank collateral frameworks.
I have taken a first step in that direction by discussing how collateral frame-
works work and interact with markets, banks, and, ultimately, the real economy.
I argue that collateral frameworks can bias the private provision of real liquidity
and thereby also the allocation of resources in the economy. They can affect
market prices of financial assets and undermine the efficient working of money
markets. More generally, they can impair market forces and discipline and pro-
mote politics in the monetary and financial system. Most obviously, collateral
frameworks affect the balance sheets of central banks. As emphasized by Klaas
Knot, President of the Dutch central bank, a weak balance sheet can undermine
a central bank’s credibility, with unfortunate consequences for financial stability
and the real economy. These issues have been explored using the very interesting
and intriguing case of the euro area as a basis of illustration and case study.
The collateral framework designed by the ECB for the euro appears to suffer,
to varying degrees, from all of the above predicaments. Most striking, perhaps, is
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how it appears to sidestep market discipline. The amount of central bank money
a bank can obtain from the Eurosystem against a given security, the security’s
collateral value, is set by the ECB with relatively minor input from the markets.
Haircuts do not reflect market conditions and the prices to which they are applied
to calculate collateral values are in the majority of cases based on theoretical
models rather than direct market prices. Given that there are 30-40,000 different
securities on the public list of eligible collateral in the Eurosystem, the lack of
market forces in setting the terms of exchange between banks and the Eurosystem
is, perhaps, not surprising.
That the ECB sets collateral values with little market input points to the
collateral framework being a tool of the central bank. This is especially so because
the terms of exchange spill over into other markets. We know, for example,
that Eurosystem haircuts are used in repos organized by central counterparties.
Incentives to produce collateral are affected too. There has been a growth in
the production and usage of lower quality collateral over time. This leads to the
question as to why the ECB should wish to promote lower quality collateral. More
generally, what is the ECB targeting with its collateral policy and why is market
discipline more or less undermined by the collateral framework? Why does its
collateral framework allow for the various “oddities” documented and reviewed in
this article and further in Nyborg (2015)? As explained by, for example, Bindseil
and Papadia (2006) and Bindseil (2014), one of the considerations the ECB has
in mind with respect to its collateral policies is its own risk management. What
is less clear is why this should involve such a small role for market forces.
Given the role of politics in so many other spheres that relate to the euro,28 a
plausible explanation is that market discipline is de-emphasized to accommodate
the different countries that comprise the euro area. This may serve the function to
ease the constraints imposed by having a single currency for disparate economies.
It may reflect a wish to channel liquidity “where it is needed,” although this
should really be a job for the secondary market for liquidity rather than the
primary market. Any such need on economic grounds must relate to a lack of
integration of euro area money markets. Whatever the case, the lack of a role
for market forces in the collateral framework leaves rooms for politics as a source
of influence over this central element of monetary policy. Politics can affect the
28See, e.g., Nyborg (2015).
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set of eligible collateral as well as collateral values. As documented in this paper,
government guarantees are used to gain eligibility and improve collateral values.
While issues relating to the euro necessarily have occupied a large part of this
paper, its main message is that collateral frameworks are an important part of
monetary policy. Because their influence reaches to financial markets and the real
economy, more knowledge and transparency about collateral frameworks would
be welcome so that economists can start to gauge their impact and, hopefully,
even better monetary policies can be pursued.
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Table 1: Eurosystem haircuts for marketable collateral from October 1, 2013
The information in this table was still in force as of January 31, 2015.
Sources: This is taken from Nyborg (2015), which contains additional information regarding haircuts for non-marketable collateral. The main original source is ECB
(2013/35). The haircuts apply from November 1, 2013 for own-use covered bonds.
Notes: (†) This relates to haircuts of ABSs with a second-best rating below A- that fulfill certain additional requirements (see ECB, 2013/36). (a) Except ABSs backed by residential mortgages
or loans to SMEs issued before June 20, 2012 that do not fulfill certain standard eligibility criteria, but have a credit quality of at least BBB-. These have a haircut of 22% (see ECB, 2013/36).
The following notes are as reported in ECB (2013/35, ANNEXES 1 and 2) and ECB (2011/14, Table 6):(1) In general, the issuer classification determines the liquidity category. However, all
asset-backed securities are included in category V, regardless of the classification of the issuer, and jumbo covered bank bonds are included in category II, while traditional covered bank bonds,
other covered bank bonds and other debt instruments issued by credit institutions are included in category III and IV. (2) Debt certificates issued by the ECB and debt instruments issued by
the NCBs prior to the adoption of the euro in their respective member state are included in liquidity category I. (3) Only instruments with an issuing volume of at least EUR 1 billion, for which
at least three market-makers provide regular bid and ask quotes, fall into the asset class of jumbo covered bank bonds. (4) Only marketable assets issued by issuers that have been classified as
agencies by the ECB are included in liquidity category II. Marketable assets issued by other agencies are included in liquidity category III or IV, depending on the issuer and asset type. (5)
Non-UCITS compliant covered bonds, including both structured covered bonds and multi-issuer covered bonds are included in liquidity category III. (6) Individual asset-backed securities, covered
bank bonds (jumbo covered bank bonds, traditional covered bank bonds, and other covered bank bonds) and uncovered bank bonds that are theoretically valued in accordance with Section 6.5 of
Annex I to Guideline ECB/2011/14 are subject to an additional valuation haircut. This haircut is directly applied at the level of the theoretical valuation of the individual debt instrument in the
form of a valuation markdown of 5%. Furthermore, an additional valuation markdown is applied to own-use covered bonds. This valuation markdown is 8% for own-use covered bonds in Credit
Quality Steps 1 and 2, and 12% for own-use covered bonds in Credit Quality Step 3 [“For these purposes, ‘own-use covered bonds’ means covered bank bonds issued by either a counterparty or
entities closely linked to it, and used in a percentage greater than 75% of the outstanding notional amount by that counterparty and/or its closely linked entities” (ECB, 2013/35, p. 9)]. (7)
Ratings as specified in the Eurosystem’s harmonized rating scale, published on the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu).
Haircut categories for marketable assets(1)
Category I Category II(6) Category III(6) Category IV(6) Category V(6)
Central government debt Local and regional govern- Traditional covered bank Credit institution debt Asset-backed
instruments, ment debt instruments, bonds, instruments (unsecured), securitiesa
Debt instruments issued Jumbo covered bank bonds,(3) Debt instruments issued by Debt instruments issued
by central banks(2) Agency debt instruments,(4) non-financial corporations by financial corporations
Supranational debt and other issuers,(4) other than credit institu-
instruments Other covered bank bonds(5) tions (unsecured)
Residual
Credit maturity fixed zero fixed zero fixed zero fixed zero
quality (years) coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon coupon
0-1 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.5 6.5
10.0
Steps 1 1-3 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.0 3.0 8.5 9.0
and 2 3-5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 11.0 11.5
(AAA 5-7 2.0 3.0 3.5 4.5 4.5 6.0 12.5 13.5
to A-)(7) 7-10 3.0 4.0 4.5 6.5 6.0 8.0 14.0 15.5
>10 5.0 7.0 8.0 10.5 9.0 13.0 17.0 22.5
0-1 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 13.0 13.0
22.0†
Step 3 1-3 7.0 8.0 10.0 14.5 15.0 16.5 24.5 26.5
(BBB+ 3-5 9.0 10.0 15.5 20.5 22.5 25.0 32.5 36.5
to 5-7 10.0 11.5 16.0 22.0 26.0 30.0 36.0 40.0
BBB-)(7) 7-10 11.5 13.0 18.5 27.5 27.0 32.5 37.0 42.5
>10 13.0 16.0 22.5 33.0 27.5 35.0 37.5 44.0
4
4
Table 1 – continued from previous page
Floating rate debt instruments:
Haircut is that applied to zero-to-one-year maturity buckets of fixed coupon instruments in liquidity and credit quality category to which the instrument is assigned.
Inverse floating rate debt instruments:
Haircuts applied to inverse floating rate debt instruments included in categories I to IV are the same but differ with respect to maturity bucket and credit quality
categories. Haircuts as a function of residual maturity (residual maturity, haircut):
AAA to A-: 0-1, 7.5; 1-3, 11.5; 3-5, 16.0; 5-7, 19.5; 7-10, 22.5; >10, 28.0. BBB+ to BBB-: 0-1, 21.0; 1-3, 46.5; 3-5, 63.5; 5-7, 68.0; 7-10, 69.0; >10, 69.5.
Marketable assets denominated in foreign currency (yen, pounds sterling, and US dollars): there is an additional haircut which is applied in the form
of a valuation markdown before applying the regular haircut. Valuation markdowns are as follows: Pounds sterling and US dollars: 16%; Yen: 26%.
Debt instruments issued by credit institutions and traded on non-regulated markets: same haircuts as for other marketable assets.
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Figure 1: EURO STOXX Index and Euribor-OIS spread (3-month)
Time period: June 20, 2005 – June 30, 2014
OIS is “Overnight Index Swap” and in this case, is the Eonia Swap. The spread
is the difference between Euribor and the Eonia Swap and is in basis points.
Data source: http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?
symbol=SXXE and http://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/
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Figure 2 : Central banks’ balance sheets over time
Figure 2a graphs the size of the Eurosystem’s consolidated balance sheet over time
as well as those of selected central banks. Numbers are normalized, with 2004
representing 100% for each bank. Figure 2b graphs the balance sheet sizes as a
percentage of GDP in the respective countries. For the Eurosystem, the aggregate
GDP across euro area countries on a year by year basis is used. Datapoints are
year end from 2000 - 2013 and in (a) 6/2014 for all banks except Bank of China
(3/2014). Data source: Balance sheet statistics are from the respective central
banks’ web-pages. GDP data is from the World Bank, Eurostat, and the central
banks’ web-pages.
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Figure 3 : Eligible assets and collateral used
Figure 5a on the left shows eligible marketable assets in each collateral class as a percentage of the total eligible marketable
assets per year. Amounts are nominal in EUR billion, averages of end of month data over each time period shown. For
the years 2012 and 2013 ECB shows quarterly data (see ECB webpage, data source given below). Figure 5a shows yearly
averages of ECB’s quarterly data.
Figure 5b on the right shows the amount of used collateral in each collateral class as a percentage of the total used
collateral per year. This includes non-marketable assets, which are not part of ECB’s eligible asset list. Amounts are
after valuation and haircuts in EUR billion, averages of end of month data over each time period shown. Similarly to
the eligible assets, ECB shows quarterly data for the years 2012 and 2013 (see ECB webpage, data source given below).
Figure 5b shows yearly averages of ECB’s quarterly data.
In general for both Figures 5a and 5b data are compiled by the ECB for quarterly reference periods. Past data may be
revised, e.g., as a result of methodological changes in the compilation of the source data (see ECB webpage, data source
given below).
Data source: ECB webpage; collateral data from February 14, 2014; http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/html/
index.en.html; downloaded on March 20, 2014.
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Figure 4: Determination of collateral values in the collateral framework
Solid lines and boxes indicate features and elements of the collateral framework.
Dashed lines point to variables that may influence market prices and, thereby,
collateral values indirectly. The dotted line indicates that guarantees can influence
haircuts directly.
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Figure 5 : Number of government guaranteed issuers and collateral
Time period: April 8, 2010 – June 11, 2014
These figures graph the number of issuers with government (central, regional, lo-
cal) guaranteed collateral as well as the number of such collateral over time on
the Eurosystem’s public list of eligible collateral. Figures 4a and 4b contain the
graphs for credit institutions only, while Figures 4c and 4d cover all issuers and
collateral. Separate graphs are provided for Italian (IT) and non-Italian (Non-IT)
issuers and issues. The vertical lines represent the two three-year LTROs, held on
December 21, 2011 and February 29, 2012, respectively.
Data source: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/assets/html/list.en.
html
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